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— Note —
Clearing the Judicial Fog:
Codifying Abstention
“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it
should. . . . With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case
may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other
would be treason to the constitution.”
-Chief Justice John Marshall1
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1.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
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Introduction
On November 24, 2014, a state official allegedly lied to the public,
and the law barred those with knowledge from revealing the truth.
Within six weeks, a whistleblower filed a federal complaint to challenge
the state statute that silenced her and to vindicate her First Amendment rights. She claimed that the November 24 statement of St. Louis
County Prosecuting Attorney Robert P. McCulloch—describing a
grand jury’s purportedly “collective” decision, based on all possible evidence, not to indict Darren Wilson, the police officer who had shot and
killed Michael Brown three months earlier in Ferguson, Missouri—was
profoundly misleading and should be corrected with facts from the
grand jurors themselves.2 Under the name “Grand Juror Doe,” she filed
a complaint on January 5, 2015, in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Missouri’s statute criminalizing a grand juror’s disclosure of the evidence or proceedings violated the First Amendment.3
To this day, the merits of this challenge to Missouri law have not
been addressed except by an elected state judge. The federal district
court, on May 5, 2015, decided to abstain from hearing the case, citing
the so-called Pullman4 abstention doctrine as its justification.5 Grand
Juror Doe appealed the decision, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the abstention on June 20, 2016.6
Grand Juror Doe was forced to bring her action under the federal
Constitution to Missouri state court, and the case was dismissed with
prejudice on December 13, 2016.7 Almost exactly one year later, on
December 12, 2017, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
2.

Jeremy Kohler, Statement of St. Louis Prosecuting Attorney Robert P.
McCulloch, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/statement-of-st-louis-prosecutingattorney-robert-p-mcculloch/article_2becfef3-9b4b-5e1e-9043-f586f389ef91.
html [https://perma.cc/GNY7-QU37]; Complaint for Prospective Relief at
6, Doe v. McCulloch, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (No. 4:15-cv00006), 2015 WL 47623.

3.

Complaint for Prospective Relief, supra note 2, at 1, 9–10.

4.

R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

5.

Doe v. McCulloch, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1012–15 (E.D. Mo. 2015).

6.

Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2016). Grand Juror Doe
successfully moved to proceed under a pseudonym in the district court. The
Eighth Circuit followed suit by using feminine pronouns for Grand Juror
Doe, and this Note does the same. Id. at 786 n.1.

7.

Doe v. McCulloch, No. 15SL-CC01891, 2016 WL 9000971, (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 2016), aff’d, No. ED 105181, 2017 WL 6327682, (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2017), motion for transfer to Supreme Court filed, No. SC96950 (Mo. Feb.
13, 2018).
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court’s dismissal.8 As of this writing, her motion for a transfer to the
Supreme Court of Missouri is pending.9
After exhausting her state-court appeals, pursuant to Pullman
abstention and an England10 reservation, Grand Juror Doe may ultimately return to the Eastern District of Missouri at the conclusion of
all state court proceedings. This will occur no sooner than 2018, for a
case that could have been decided three years prior. Potentially,
Pullman abstention will have resulted in the chilling or silencing of constitutionally protected speech for an extended period of time while
Grand Juror Doe bore the expense of years of litigation before her day
in federal court to decide a federal question about the scope of the First
Amendment.
Abstention is a collection of doctrines that largely create enormous
waste and that overwhelm the perceived benefits of their implementation. Inefficiency in the judicial system leaves litigants with high
transaction costs from added proceedings, extended delay in reaching a
resolution, and a potentially elongated chilling effect on constitutional
rights. Not only does abstention create unnecessary obstacles for litigants, but this Note also argues that abstention is needlessly complicated, leading to situations in which litigants are further burdened by
judicial error. This Note proposes legislation to codify the entirety of
abstention in federal courts so as to streamline judicial efficiency and
promote clarity within the doctrines.
Part I of this Note will examine the various abstention doctrines
used in the United States. Part II will address the issues that arise from
the use of these abstention doctrines. Part III will introduce potential
solutions to the problems created by abstention, along with the possible
consequences from adopting the solutions. Part IV will focus on the
proposed abstention legislation, and how it can improve the judicial
system.11

I. Abstention in Federal Courts
Abstention is not one specific doctrine, but a collection of common
law doctrines addressing situations in which a federal court has jurisdiction over a case but decides not to exercise that jurisdiction. Courts
8.

Doe. v. McCulloch, No. ED 105181, 2017 WL 6327682, (Mo. Ct. App. Dec.
12, 2017).

9.

Application for Transfer to the Supreme Court, Doe v. McCulloch, No.
SC96950 (Mo. Feb. 13, 2018).

10.

England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).

11.

While this topic necessitates a discussion of both federal and state
procedures, this Note aims to propose only federal legislation, and thus
solutions are made from that perspective.
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generally apply abstention to facilitate a stable relationship between
state courts and their federal counterparts.12 This can sometimes take
the form of an unclear issue of state law, a parallel proceeding in state
court, or a complex state administrative structure, to name a few
examples.
Depending on which doctrine the court uses to justify its decision
to abstain, the result is typically a stay of federal proceedings, although
sometimes it can be outright dismissal. A stay is issued when there
remains a federal interest aside from the state interest in the case, and
the litigants are invited to continue in federal court at a later time if
necessary.

A. Pullman Abstention for Unclear State Law
Pullman abstention was “[d]esigned to avoid federal-court error in
deciding state-law questions antecedent to federal constitutional issues.”13 This particular doctrine, which was created in the case of
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company,14 generally allows
a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction because of an unclear
issue of state law as to which a particular resolution could render the
federal issue moot.15
At the time of the case, the Pullman Company manufactured sleeper cars that could be coupled to trains for overnight travel. Railroad
companies would operate and staff the train generally, while the
Pullman Company staffed and operated the sleeper cars under the general control of the railroad companies where applicable.16 Employee positions at the Pullman Company were divided by race. African Americans held the position of porter, while whites held the position of
Pullman conductor. Some trains carried one sleeper car, while others
carried two or more.17 In situations where a train had only one sleeper
car, no Pullman conductor was utilized, and the porter would operate
the Pullman car under the control of the train’s conductor.18

12.

See Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in the Twenty-First
Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will Always Be with Us—Get Over It!!,
36 Creighton L. Rev. 375, 376 (2003) (“These abstention doctrines cases
reflect complex considerations designed to avoid friction between federal and
state courts.”).

13.

Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997).

14.

312 U.S. 496 (1941).

15.

Id. at 501.

16.

Id. at 497–98.

17.

Id. at 497.

18.

Id.
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The Texas Railroad Commission ruled that a Pullman conductor
was necessary for the operation of a sleeper car, regardless of the number of sleeper cars on the train.19 The Pullman Company sued the Railroad Commission in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Texas, claiming the order violated both Texas law and the U.S. Constitution. The porters intervened in the suit, and challenged the commission’s order as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.20
The three-judge district court noted that the commission had the
power to pass regulations that would correct abuses.21 The district court
then determined that the commission only had the power to correct an
“abuse which has been defined by the law.”22 The court ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs on the grounds that the commission lacked the authority for its order; the court did not address any other issues.23
Citing a desire to avoid ruling on the sensitive constitutional issue
of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court stated that the case must
be viewed solely through the lens of Texas law.24 Instead of actually
grappling with state law, however, the Court announced that the Texas
Supreme Court should hold the final word on the meaning of the Texas
statute.25 Although the Court noted the district court judges’ experience
with Texas law, it also characterized the Court as “outsiders without
special competence in Texas law,” and stated its lack of confidence in
any decision it could render on the issue.26
In carving out Pullman abstention, the Court stated:
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an
issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced
19.

Id. at 497–98.

20.

Id. at 498. The contrast of testimony from the porters and witnesses called
by the Commission showed the stark racism embedded into the
Commission’s order, highlighting the Fourteenth Amendment claim. While
witnesses for the Commission stated they would more readily obey the
authority of a white conductor over a black porter, the porters who took the
stand—who were all experienced, educated, and respected in their
communities—stated that asserting authority was not the way to effectively
carry out their duties. Lauren Robel, Riding the Color Line: The Story of
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., in Federal Courts
Stories 163, 171–75 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds. 2010).

21.

Pullman Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 33 F. Supp. 675, 676 (W.D. Tex.
1940) (three judge court).

22.

Id.

23.

Id. at 677–78.

24.

Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498.

25.

Id. at 499–500.

26.

Id. at 499.
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tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly
promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus
supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The
resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the
waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature
constitutional adjudication. . . .
[Prior Supreme Court decisions] reflect a doctrine of abstention
appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts,
“exercising a wise discretion,” restrain their authority because of
“scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state
governments” and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.
This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in
furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal
authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of
those powers.27

The Pullman doctrine was created as a response to a lack of guidance from the Texas Supreme Court in an effort to harmonize the state
and federal court systems.28 But under what circumstances should a federal court utilize the Pullman doctrine to abstain from deciding a case?
First, it is worth pointing out that whether the state courts have
heard the issue is irrelevant “when the unconstitutionality of the particular state action under challenge is clear.”29 In those circumstances, abstention is unnecessary, even if the state courts have not been afforded
the opportunity to address that particular issue.
Furthermore, “abstention is not proper if the federal and state
constitutional provisions are identical.”30 Abstention under Pullman
was not intended “merely to await an attempt to vindicate the claim
in a state court.”31 Courts have affirmed decisions to abstain, however,
when the unclear law in question is unique to the state.32
A companion to Pullman abstention is the England reservation,
named for the case England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
27.

Id. at 500–01 (citations omitted).

28.

Id.

29.

Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
756 (1986).

30.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 840 (7th ed. 2016).

31.

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971); see also Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967) (“[A]bstention cannot be ordered simply to
give state courts the first opportunity . . . .”).

32.

See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (noting that the Constitution
of Alaska contained provisions regarding fish resources, and a challenge to a
statute allegedly violating that provision was unique to the state of Alaska).
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Examiners.33 While the majority opinion does not specifically mention
Pullman, the case involved a group of chiropractors seeking an injunction against the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, arguing
that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by barring them from practice for failing to meet its educational requirements.34 The district court
abstained because a determination that the statute in question did not
apply to chiropractors could decide the entire case.35 The chiropractors
returned to state court and ultimately lost on both the state and the
federal issues in the Louisiana state-court system.36 When the chiropractors returned to federal court, the district court dismissed the case,
indicating that the state court addressed all the issues—including the
federal issue—and that they should have petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court instead of returning to the district court.37
Following the district court’s dismissal, the chiropractors appealed
their way up to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, noted that “[t]here are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a
Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims can be
compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to
accept instead a state court’s determination of those claims.”38 The
Court determined that following abstention, a party moving to state
court has the choice of deciding where the federal claims will be litigated.39 The party may choose to litigate the federal claim in the state
court, which would extinguish the party’s right to return to the district
court.40 Alternatively, the party may present the federal claim to the
state court solely for context, while also explicitly reserving the right
to return to the district court.41 In this event, the party’s right to return
to the district court following the litigation of the state claim is

33.

375 U.S. 411 (1964).

34.

Id. at 412–13.

35.

England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 180 F. Supp. 121, 124 (E.D. La.
1960).

36.

The chiropractors lost in the Louisiana Court of Appeals, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied their petition for review. England v. La. State Bd. of
Med. Exam’rs, 126 So. 2d 51, 56–57 (La. Ct. App. 1960); England v. La.
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. La. 1961).

37.

England, 194 F. Supp. at 522.

38.

England, 375 U.S. at 415.

39.

Id. at 418.

40.

Id. at 419.

41.

Id. at 421–22.
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preserved, even if the state court decides on its own to rule on the
merits of the federal claim.42
B. Thibodaux Abstention for Unclear State Law with Diversity
Jurisdiction

As a general rule, courts do not abstain from hearing cases of unclear state law brought to federal court on diversity grounds.43 The
Supreme Court carved out a notable exception, however, in the case of
Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux.44
In that case, the city of Thibodaux had recently expanded its
boundaries and sought to condemn facilities of an electric company
within the newly annexed territory.45 The city claimed authority under
a state statute allowing Louisiana municipalities to expropriate utility
service property in the public interest.46 While the city originally
brought the case in Louisiana state court, Louisiana Power & Light
Company, a Florida corporation, removed the case to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.47
The district court grappled with the concept that the statute
granted eminent domain power to a subdivision of the state, noting
that in those circumstances, “the extent to which it may be exercised
is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in
which the grant is contained.”48 The court also noted the seriousness of
eminent domain, asserting that “the power of eminent domain is one of
the attributes of sovereignty most fraught with the possibility of abuse
and injustice.”49 Such gravity to the issue prompted the court to mention that before recognizing the power of eminent domain, “[a] federal
court . . . must make certain that that power has been granted by the
state . . . .”50

42.

Id. at 421 (“[T]he litigant is in no event to be denied his right to return to
the District Court unless it clearly appears that he voluntarily . . . fully
litigated his federal claims in the state courts.”).

43.

Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 844–45.

44.

360 U.S. 25 (1959).

45.

City of Thibodaux v. La. Power & Light Co., 153 F. Supp. 515, 516 (E.D.
La. 1957).

46.

Id. at 516 n.2.

47.

Id. at 516 n.1.

48.

Id. at 517.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.
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Before the case came to the district court, no court—state or federal—had ever interpreted the statute at hand.51 The only authority the
court was able to find on the issue was an opinion from the Louisiana
Attorney General. The opinion was on an identical set of circumstances,
but the lack of judicial interpretation “[gave the] court pause.”52
The U.S. Supreme Court deemed the district court’s abstention
from the case to be a proper use of its discretion.53 The Court affirmed
abstention from ruling due to the state’s interest in its own eminent
domain laws.54 As a result, federal courts could now abstain from judgment in a diversity case when a decision on an unclear issue of state
law would have an impact on a state interest affecting “sovereign prerogative.”55
C. Burford Abstention for Unclear State Law with Complex State
Administrative Procedures

Just two years after the Supreme Court created Pullman abstention, the Court added a second, somewhat similar, doctrine called
Burford abstention. Burford v. Sun Oil Company56 involved oil drilling
in Texas, for which the state had created complex a state administration to handle decision-making on the subject.57 Burford began
when the Texas Railroad Commission granted Burford a permit to drill
four oil wells, and Sun brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the
order.58 The district court dismissed the case, and appeals eventually
brought the case before the U.S. Supreme Court.59 The Court detailed
the complexities of oil drilling in Texas, specifically noting that the field
in question had “approximately nine hundred operators.”60 The Court
also mentioned, as an example of the intricacy of the administrative
system, the commission’s Rule 37, noting that “[i]t is estimated that
over two-thirds of the wells in the East Texas field exist as exceptions
to the rule, and since each exception may provoke a conflict among the
interested par-ties, the volume of litigation arising from the admin51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959).

54.

See id. at 28.

55.

Id.

56.

319 U.S. 315 (1943).

57.

Id. at 318–19.

58.

Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1941).

59.

Id. at 468, 470.

60.

Burford, 319 U.S. at 319.
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istration of the rule is considerable.”61 The Supreme Court further spoke
to the importance of having a unified body making these impactful
decisions, and it ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision to
dismiss the case.62
A notable difference between Burford abstention and Pullman abstention is that the former requires the court to dismiss the case, rather
than to simply grant a stay of proceedings while the state issues are resolved.63 The Court subsequently expanded Burford abstention to dismiss cases containing both a strong local interest and the existence of
a state-based regulatory system. This broad reading came from
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co.,64 which
differed from Burford in that the Court—hearing a case involving the
denial of a request to decommission two train lines for a lack of profitability—focused more on the existence of a state regulatory procedure
as opposed to the complexity of one.65
This modification, however, has not been widely used by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions. A few decades later, the Court
walked this decision back a few steps and reaffirmed that any abstention based upon a state regulatory system must be done only if a decision would “disrupt the State’s attempt to ensure uniformity in the
treatment of an essentially local problem.”66 The Court also made it
clear that Burford abstention was only appropriate for cases demanding
declaratory or equitable relief.67

61.

Id. at 324.

62.

Id. at 333–34.

63.

See id. at 334.

64.

341 U.S. 341 (1951).

65.

See id. at 349–50. Despite agreeing with the overall result, Justice
Frankfurter penned a highly critical concurrence, characterizing the case as
a “flagrant contradiction” with stare decisis. Justice Frankfurter listed a
number of cases, including Pullman and Burford, and believed the case at
hand was distinguishable, writing that “the claim that is made here is within
the easy grasp of federal judges, and certainly within the competence of three
judges bred in Alabama law, with wide experience in its administration.” Id.
at 360–62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

66.

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Southern Railway Co.,
341 U.S. at 347).

67.

See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (“Because
this was a damages action, we conclude the District Court’s remand order
was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine.”).
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D. Younger Abstention to Avoid Interference with Pending State Court
Proceedings

The Court added a new doctrine in the 1970 case Younger v.
Harris.68 John Harris brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California seeking an injunction against a state prosecution because the California statute at issue violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.69 A three-judge panel struck down the statute
as unconstitutional on its face.70
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court’s decision granting the injunction.71 The Court noted that as a general rule,
injunctions against pending state criminal prosecutions were not
available.72 Justice Black, writing for the Court, mentioned that there
could be exceptions to this general rule, but stated that “there is no
point in our attempting now to specify what they might be.”73 Harris
did not allege bad faith or indicate a pattern of harassment, so the
Court did not find his arguments in favor of an injunction compelling.74
More applicable to Harris, even a statute abridging First Amendment
rights on its face is not enough to authorize an injunction.75 The Court
did go on to say, however, that “[t]here may . . . be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even
in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.”76
The Younger doctrine serves a similar purpose to that of the AntiInjunction Act,77 but Younger was decided instead on the principles of
equity and comity, and the Court explicitly stated that the AntiInjunction Act was not controlling in this situation.78 The Act itself is
brief, stating “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”79
68.

401 U.S. 37 (1970).

69.

Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 508–09 (C.D. Cal. 1968).

70.

Id. at 517.

71.

Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.

72.

Id. at 53.

73.

Id. at 54.

74.

Id.

75.

Id. at 53.

76.

Id.

77.

Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012).

78.

401 U.S. at 44, 54.

79.

28 U.S.C. § 2283.
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It is not clear why the Court did not decide Younger on AntiInjunction Act grounds. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas stated
the statute was “not a bar to a federal injunction under these circumstances.”80 Douglas took the viewpoint that a § 1983 claim seeking an
injunction as an equitable remedy was an express authorization from
Congress as required by the Anti-Injunction Act.81 The Court later
agreed with this proposition in Mitchum v. Foster,82 acknowledging that
a § 1983 claim is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but also stating that Mitchum was the first case in which the Court could explicitly
decide the question.83 It is possible that when Younger was decided a
year earlier, the Court was not ready to decide the issue of whether §
1983 fit within the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception, so it opted to rule
on abstention grounds rather than statutory grounds.84
The Younger doctrine began as a means to stop federal court
interference in pending state criminal proceedings, but as it evolved,
courts began abstaining from cases involving state-initiated civil proceedings as well. Addressing a nuisance claim in Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd.85—involving efforts to close an adult movie theater—the Court
determined that the claim was more like a criminal case than other civil
claims.86 The Huffman case involved the State of Ohio as a party to the
proceeding, and criminal statutes were involved in the case.87 Two years
later, the Court went on to clarify that Younger could be applied in
any civil proceeding to which a state is a party.88
The Court first dropped the necessity of the state as a party in
Juidice v. Vail.89 In that case, the Court classified the core principle
behind Younger as deference to the state courts generally as opposed

80.

401 U.S. at 60 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

81.

Id. at 62.

82.

407 U.S. 225 (1972).

83.

Id. at 226.

84.

See Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing
Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1147 n.36 (1977) (“The AntiInjunction Act . . . was not available to Justice Black at the time of Younger
because the Court had not resolved the relation between the Act and the
Civil Rights Act.”).

85.

420 U.S. 592 (1975).

86.

Id. at 604 (“[T]he proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials.”).

87.

Id.

88.

Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1977).

89.

430 U.S. 327 (1977).
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to some necessity tied to criminal proceedings.90 The Court indicated
that an important state interest, be it criminal or civil, can be grounds
for Younger abstention.91 The Court offered a qualification on its ruling,
stating that Juidice did not answer the question of whether Younger
can apply to all civil proceedings.92
The Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Younger in the
2013 case Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs.93 Reiterating the
holding from a previous case, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of the City of New Orleans,94 the Court affirmed three
categories as being applicable to Younger abstention: “‘state criminal
prosecutions,’ ‘civil enforcement proceedings,’ and ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state
courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’”95 Writing for the
Court, Justice Ginsburg reversed the Eighth Circuit’s pro-abstention
decision, emphasizing that the circumstances giving rise to Younger abstention are “exceptional.”96
E. Colorado River Abstention to Avoid Duplicative Proceedings

Another abstention doctrine surfaced to address specific situations
involving parallel litigation in the case of Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States.97 In Colorado River, the United
States and Colorado residents became involved in a water dispute. The
United States brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado seeking declaratory relief about the rights to the water.98
Shortly thereafter, one of the defendants filed suit against the United
States in state court over the same claims as the federal suit.99
The Court first rejected the idea that the circumstances at play in
Colorado River fit into any of the currently established abstention

90.

Id. at 334.

91.

Id. at 335.

92.

Id. at 336 n.13. In a harsh dissent, Justice Brennan considered the case
“nothing less than plain refusal to enforce the congressional direction,” and
he considered the Court’s aforementioned qualification irrelevant from a
practical perspective. Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

93.

134 S. Ct. 584 (2013).

94.

491 U.S. 350 (1989).

95.

Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. at 588 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368).

96.

Id. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368).

97.

424 U.S. 800 (1976).

98.

Id. at 805.

99.

Id. at 806.
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doctrines.100 Despite this, the Court proclaimed that principles of judicial efficiency sometimes create situations in which a court should abstain.101 But while the Supreme Court showed some support for abstaining when proceedings in state court and federal court exist
simultaneously for the same issue, it also declared that abstention
should only be done in “exceptional circumstances.”102 In upholding the
district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Court looked to many
different aspects of the litigation, and found that the infancy of the federal proceeding,103 extensiveness of the state involvement,104 distance between the two courts,105 and the U.S. participation in the related statecourt proceedings weighed in favor of abstaining from the case.106
The Colorado River Court outlined some factors to consider in abstaining due to parallel litigation: “the inconvenience of the federal
forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the order
in which jurisdiction was obtained . . . .”107 The Court determined that
no single factor is determinative, and that “[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal.”108
A few years later, the Court had the opportunity to clarify when
Colorado River abstention should be invoked. The Court reaffirmed the
holding in Colorado River and also stated that a federal court cannot
abstain simply because parallel litigation exists. In Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation,109 a contractor petitioned the federal court to compel arbitration after a hospital
brought suit in state court.110 In affirming the Court of Appeals’ reversal
of a stay pending the outcome of the state proceeding, the Supreme
Court also added factors to the Colorado River analysis: the source,
either federal or state, of the law in question and the adequacy of the
state-court proceedings to protect an individual’s rights.111 In that case,
100. Id. at 813.
101. Id. at 817.
102. Id. at 813.
103. Outside of the motion to dismiss giving rise to the appeal, the only other
filing in the federal proceeding was the complaint. Id. at 820.
104. The United States’ lawsuit was brought against 1,000 defendants. Id.
105. The state court was located 300 miles away from the district court. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 818 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 818–19.
109. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
110. Id. at 7.
111. Id. at 23–27.
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the Court also established that these factors are not a “mechanical
checklist, but . . . a careful balancing of the important factors as they
apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction.”112 The presence of a federal question was important to the Court in ruling against abstention.113

II. Abstention Facilitates Inefficiency
Legal scholars have covered abstention from a variety of different
angles.114 This Note will address abstention not from a theoretical perspective, but rather from a policy perspective. Here, the validity of the
Court’s creation of the pertinent common law doctrines will be put
aside in favor of addressing the tangible impact the use of these doctrines has.
In practice, the different abstention doctrines create different problems with judicial inefficiency. These problems include an increased burden on the litigants through cost and delay, a chilling effect on asserted
rights, and a lack of clarity as to when the lower courts should abstain
from a case.
A. Abstention Places an Undue Burden on Litigants

Litigation can be an arduous process. A case can take years after
filing to be resolved, and it can generate substantial expenses in the
process. In many instances, abstention increases these costs.
Consider a situation in which a party brings a state claim and a
federal claim in federal court. If the court decides to abstain through
either a dismissal or a stay of proceedings, that order is immediately
appealable.115 If the litigant is adamant on having his claim heard in
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. at 26.
114. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An
Essay on the Distinction Between “Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory
Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847 (2013);
Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071 (1974); Martin H.
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71 (1984); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985) (arguing that federal courts,
following a set of principles of preference articulated by the author, should
employ reasoned discretion when it comes to exercising jurisdiction in order
to avoid overburdening themselves and unduly interfering with the states).
115. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9–10
(1983) (holding that an appeal to an abstention stay was proper because the
stay order put the litigants “effectively out of court” (quoting Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962))).
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federal court, he must then bear the expense of appealing the decision
in the federal courts. Should that not produce a favorable outcome, the
litigant must then move to the state courts and pursue the case there.
This could further include more appeals at the state level before potentially allowing the litigant back into the federal court he chose in the
first place.
Much of the reasoning behind the “state law trio”116 of abstention
doctrines stems from deference to the state court system by the federal
court system.117 The idea is that the federal court should defer to the
state court so that the issue can be decided correctly. It is debatable,
however, whether abstention actually results in these issues being decided correctly more often. The assumption here is that the state
court—by nature of being the state court ruling on unclear issues of
state law—is inherently more likely to be correct on the issue than a
federal court could be.118 The error in this assumption is that “[t]he
standard . . . refers to the highest court of the state.”119 In many ways,
a lower state court decision has little more precedential weight than a
ruling from the federal court. So is the resulting cost to the litigant
justifiable in this instance?
If one wants to argue that the state court has the right to take ownership of the issue, then maybe abstention is justified. The Pullman decision cites avoiding “friction” as a motivating factor to abstain from
ruling, but does not explain further.120 Federal courts often decide issues
of state law, regardless of whether the state’s highest court has spoken
on the issue.121 How much weight should we give to any inherent ownership right of the state courts? When the benefit is only slight, and
the cost to the litigants is so great, the importance of preserving this
116. The “state law trio” refers to Pullman, Burford, and Thibodaux, which all
deal with some aspect of an unclear state law.
117. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (“Few
public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal
chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies . . . .”).
118. See Field, supra note 114, at 1091 (finding that abstention discussions
frequently assume the state court will come to the correct decision on
remand).
119. Id.
120. 312 U.S. at 500.
121. See, e.g., Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010)
(“When there is no state supreme court case directly on point, our role is to
predict how the state supreme court would rule if faced with the [same issue]
before us.” (quoting Northland Cas. Co. v. Meeks, 540 F.3d 869, 874 (8th
Cir. 2008))); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081,
1086 (3d Cir. 1980) (“New Jersey has not taken a position on this question,
so . . . we must predict which view the New Jersey Supreme Court would
adopt . . . .”).
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deference to the state courts lessens. Judith Kaye, former Chief Judge
of the New York Court of Appeals, recognized the delay and expense
caused by abstention, and concluded that “it soon became apparent
that abstention was not an effective solution to the problem of federal
courts seeking to ascertain state law.”122
B. Abstention Can Have a Chilling Effect on Individual Rights

Grand Juror Doe filed suit in federal court because she wanted to
exercise what she believed to be her rights under the First Amendment.123 With litigation having carried on for over a year, and proceedings still ongoing, has the need to go through so much effectively
chilled free speech?
The Supreme Court has considered the possibility that delayed resolution of cases involving constitutional challenges could produce this
undesirable result.124 Despite this, the Court has not provided a definitive answer on the appropriate action in those circumstances, although
it did note that it has “been particularly reluctant to abstain in cases
involving facial challenges based on the First Amendment.”125 Still,
given both the financial and mental cost of prolonged litigation, it is
not surprising that some litigants would view an entirely new set of
proceedings brought about by abstention as a motivating factor in
dropping their claims.
C. Lower Courts Are Not Clear on When to Apply Abstention

No matter what goals one thinks abstention should achieve, the
lower courts’ ability to fulfill those objectives can work only as long as
they understand when to abstain and when not to abstain from hearing
a case. Some doctrines have been clearer than others, but abstention as
a whole could benefit from codification in order to provide lower federal
courts with a clear directive as to the circumstances that warrant
abstaining.
In Grand Juror Doe’s case, the federal district court originally abstained under Burford and Pullman, and it dismissed her entire case.126

122. Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism:
Certified Questions in New York, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 380 (2000).
123. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text.
124. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967) (“[T]o force the plaintiff who
has commenced a federal action to suffer the delay of state court proceedings
might itself effect the impermissible chilling of the very constitutional right
he seeks to protect.”).
125. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987).
126. Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2016). The district court’s
usage of Burford as the driving force of its decision is peculiar. Not only was
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On appeal, Grand Juror Doe argued that Burford abstention was
inappropriate while also noting that the court should have retained
jurisdiction if abstaining under Pullman.127 Grand Juror Doe crafted her
briefs and oral argument to the Eighth Circuit so as to carefully avoid
asserting a claim under state law, instead choosing to focus on whether
the district court erred in relying on Burford and dismissing the case.128
Despite this, the Eighth Circuit—possibly treating the slight nudge
towards the use of Pullman abstention over Burford as an implied argument for a state claim that would obviate a federal decision—extrapolated Grand Juror Doe’s argument into “whether and to what extent
the [grand jury secrecy] statute applies to her.”129 In a sense, the district
court’s confusion over which abstention doctrine to apply led to Grand
Juror Doe being forced to argue in favor of moving her case out of
federal court temporarily pursuant to Pullman, because the alternative—the court abstaining under Burford and dismissing the case—
would shut her out of federal court until a potential Supreme Court
review of the Missouri Supreme Court.
It is not always clear whether abstention is discretionary or mandatory. The Supreme Court has seemingly ruled in both directions,
although more recent decisions tend to support the doctrine as discretionary.130 Furthermore, where a statute creates exclusive federal
jurisdiction, it is unclear if abstention is proper. The Fifth Circuit has
deemed that it is not.131 Although the Supreme Court declined to review
abstaining under Burford wholly inappropriate given the circumstances, but
neither party cited the case in the numerous briefs on the issue.
127. Brief of Appellant at 27–33, Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2016)
(No. 15-2667).
128. Id. at 33–36; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, 19, Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d
785 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2667); Oral Argument at 00:00–12:15, 28:38–
31:28, Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2667),
http://media-oa.ca8.uscourts.gov/OAaudio/2016/3/152667.MP3.
129. McCulloch, 835 F.3d at 788.
130. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727–28 (1996) (“[T]he
power to dismiss under the Burford doctrine, as with other abstention
doctrines, . . . derives from the discretion historically enjoyed by courts of
equity.”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964) (“The abstention
doctrine is not an automatic rule . . . ; it rather involves a discretionary
exercise . . . .”); City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639,
640 (1959) (“Proper exercise of federal jurisdiction requires that
controversies involving unsettled questions of state law be decided in the
state tribunals preliminary to a federal court’s consideration of the
underlying federal constitutional questions.” (emphasis added)).
131. Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1059 (5th Cir. 1980) (“When Congress has
directed
.
.
.
that
[federal
courts]
have
exclusive
jurisdiction . . . , abstention . . . defeats the purpose of that legislation.”).
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the Fifth Circuit case establishing that opinion, at least one member of
the Court likely supports that viewpoint.132
The uncertainty surrounding abstention has created circuit splits
with regard to Pullman and its requirements. The Second, Third, Sixth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits utilize a three-part test to determine if
Pullman abstention is appropriate.133 This test has generally considered
the level of uncertainty in the state-law issue, how much an interpretation of the state law could affect the federal law outcome, and whether
an interpretation of the state law could obviate or change the federal
constitutional issue.134 In the Fifth Circuit, however, the parts of the
three-part test are considered factors, and only one is necessary to allow
abstention.135 This only becomes more uncertain when dealing with
Thibodaux abstention in diversity cases.136 Unsurprisingly, lower court
disagreement has carried over into Burford abstention as well.137 Clarity
appears to resume—at least in comparison—when looking to lower
court interpretations of Younger and Colorado River abstention, but
132. See Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1109 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“When Congress speaks definitively, . . . state courts may not act to
obstruct or unsettle the congressional design.”).
133. Burdick v. Takushi, 846 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1988) (reformulating the
second part of the test enunciated in McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757,
761 (2d Cir. 1976), to require consideration of sensitive social policy issues
typically reserved for state courts); Vinyard v. King, 655 F.2d 1016, 1018
(10th Cir. 1981) (quoting the three-part test formulated in D’Iorio v. Cty.
of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir. 1978)); Record Revolution No. 6,
Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 925 (6th Cir. 1980) (combining the
Second Circuit’s second and third factors, and adding a consideration of the
federal decision’s potential for interference with “important state policies or
regulatory programs”).
134. McRedmond, 533 F.2d at 761; see also supra note 133 (citing cases
supporting a three-part test for Pullman abstention with only slight
differences in wording).
135. Mireles v. Crosby Cty., 724 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1984).
136. Compare United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484–85 (5th
Cir. 1964) (en banc) (abstaining in a diversity case solely because the state
law was unclear), with Miller-Davis Co. v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 567
F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding abstention in a diversity case
inappropriate, noting that an England reservation would be impossible in a
diversity situation).
137. See Neufeld v. City of Baltimore, 964 F.2d 347, 349–51 (4th Cir. 1992)
(noting the Supreme Court’s lack of a “hard-and-fast rule” from Burford and
that the federal ruling in the instant case would not disrupt a state policy);
see also Charles S. Treat, Comment, Abstention by Federal Courts in Suits
Challenging State Administrative Decisions: The Scope of the Burford
Doctrine, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 971, 980–88 (1979) (discussing examples of
the “considerable confusion” among lower courts in applying Burford).
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even then, the clarity achieved through courts developing tests and lists
of factors is undercut by the lack of uniformity.138
Even outside the merits and procedural elements, Grand Juror
Doe’s case indicates the uncertainty of abstention. Judge Roger
Wollman wrote the opinion for the Eighth Circuit in both Doe v.
McCulloch and Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs,139 the latter of
which was a Younger abstention case that was reversed by the Supreme
Court.140 At oral argument in Doe, Judge Wollman quipped that he was
“still smarting in a way from the unanimous decision that overruled . . . one of [his] opinions in the Sprint case.”141 Wollman continued
to joke that the Supreme Court “had to rub it in” when explaining the
ruling, characterizing the Court as saying, “dumb-dumb can’t you read
our cases?”142
D. Current Mechanisms Are Inadequate

Two major procedures are typically discussed in conjunction with
abstention. These procedures are England reservations and certified
questions. An England reservation is meant to ensure that a plaintiff
continues to hold access to her chosen forum, but this access can still
be delayed until the plaintiff has traversed the entire state court process.143 When returning to state court in Missouri, Grand Juror Doe explicitly made an England reservation, indicating her intention to return
to the federal district court.144 In order to comply with England, Grand
Juror Doe asserted her federal claim with the caveat that she was only
providing context for the case.145
Despite Grand Juror Doe’s England reservation, the Missouri state
court proceeded to rule on the merits of her First Amendment claim,
138. See Tyler A. Mamone, Comment, No Simple Compromise: Reconciling Duty
and Discretion Under Colorado River Abstention in Claims for Mixed Relief,
45 U. Tol. L. Rev. 347, 359 (2014) (“Circuits reviewing these cases are
forced to navigate the often confusing and less-than-uniform exceptional
circumstances test.”).
139. 690 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012).
140. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593–94 (2013).
141. Oral Argument, supra note 128, at 25:57.
142. Id. at 26:05–26:19.
143. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure
outlined in England).
144. Petition for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Doe v. McCulloch, No.
15SL-CC01891 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2016).
145. Id. at 10–11, 11 n.3 (“Plaintiff does not seek relief on Count I from this
Court. Count I is set forth here for the sole purpose of allowing this Court
to construe the relevant statutes against a backdrop of Plaintiff’s federal
constitutional challenge.”).
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making no mention of her request not to litigate the issue in that
forum.146 The Missouri Court of Appeals addressed Doe’s England reservation head on, stating that because a freedom of speech claim would
be resolved identically under the Missouri Constitution and the United
States Constitution, the trial court was correct to ignore the England
reservation and reach the merits of Doe’s federal issue.147 In these situations, the England reservation preserves the ability of a litigant to
return to the federal district court, but “issue preclusion generally binds
an abstaining federal court to those state court findings that are necessary to the state court’s holding . . . .”148 So while the England reservation serves an important function in preserving the litigant’s rights,
it can sometimes be seen as doing too little, too late—or preclude additional litigation entirely—should a state court ignore a litigant’s plea
for separation of the federal and state issues, or when such separation
is impracticable.
A certified question can be used to clarify an unclear law; it is a
process by which a federal court presents a question of law to a state
supreme court.149 Individual states have adopted certified question laws,
and the Supreme Court has supported states’ efforts to help “build a
cooperative judicial federalism.”150 A judge on the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit made much less flattering remarks about
them.151
Certified questions are, on their face, an innovative concept that
theoretically solves many abstention-related problems. They suffer,
however, from the lack of uniformity across the states. This is seen from
the perspective of both timeliness and quality of the answer.
Unfortunately, certified questions will only help expedite a case so long
as the highest court in the state answering the question is willing to
cooperate.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
drafted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act to serve as
a recommendation for states interested in adopting the certified
146. Doe v. McCulloch, No. 15SL-CC01891, slip op. at 12–13 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec.
13, 2016), aff’d, No. ED105181 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).
147. Doe v. McCulloch, No. ED105181, slip op. at 8–10 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2017), motion for transfer to Supreme Court filed, No. SC96950 (Mo. Feb.
13, 2018).
148. Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case
Adjudication, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1869, 1892 (2008).

for

Transjurisdictional

149. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 Suffolk
U. L. Rev. 677, 678 (1995).
150. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
151. Selya, supra note 149, at 681 (“[T]he beauty of certification, like the beauty
that Hollywood cherishes, is only skin-deep . . . .”).
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question procedure.152 Variation still exists, however, between the procedures eventually adopted by the states.153 This variation takes the
form of different standards for posing a question to the state court, and
which courts are permitted to issue question to the state court.154
Access tends to be the first bar to a successful certified question.
The highest court in some states will outright refuse to hear a question
posed by certain courts.155 The certified question procedure has gained
popularity in the country over the years, but still has not reached every
state.156 North Carolina’s lack of a certified question process is especially
notable when considering that every other state in the country, the
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana
Islands all have at least some variation on this procedure in place.157
Even if every jurisdiction implements a certified question procedure,
the variation in courts allowed to present such a question means a litigant’s ability to have her case fully decided in the federal forum of her
choice could be at the mercy of a state supreme court’s policy on the
procedure.
Even when access itself is not an issue to presenting a certified
question, variation still exists on the quality of the response to the question. The highest court in New York has been open to certification,
even reframing the question to “make [it] more readily answerable[,]
152. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule] (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1995).
153. See Gregory L. Acquaviva, The Certification of Unsettled Questions of State
Law to State High Courts: The Third Circuit’s Experience, 115 Penn St.
L. Rev. 377, 392 n.107 (2010) (contrasting the level of clarity between the
highest courts in New York and New Jersey in answers to certified
questions).
154. See id. at 398–99 (comparing Pennsylvania’s enumerated standards for
posing certified questions with New Jersey’s lack of standards, with
Pennsylvania allowing any Court of Appeals to certify a question as opposed
to New Jersey only allowing questions from the Third Circuit); see also id.
at 403–04 (noting Delaware’s broad acceptance of certified questions from
any federal court at the appeals or district level, along with the highest
appellate court in any state, and any Delaware court).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (illustrating variation in
acceptable certifying courts for Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware).
156. Acquaviva, supra note 153, at 383–85 (noting that only four states had a
certified question procedure in 1967, but now only North Carolina lacks such
a process).
157. Michael Klotz, Note, Avoiding Inconsistent Interpretations: United States v.
Kelly, the Fourth Circuit, and the Need for a Certification Procedure in
North Carolina, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1173, 1175 (2014). North
Carolina has introduced a bill for the 2017 session that would implement a
procedure for certified questions. H.B. 157, Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (N.C.
2017).
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and . . . remov[ing] . . . other obstacles that may not have been apparent
at the time of certification.”158 The court has similarly made an effort
to answer the question as completely as possible, even when that pertains to issues not explicitly presented in the question.159 New York has
also done well to consider timeliness when answering questions, at one
point holding an average initial response time—whether the court will
accept or reject the question—of six weeks and answer production in
six months.160
While New York may exemplify some of the more beneficial aspects
of certification, other courts illustrate how a lack of uniformity in the
process creates disparate outcomes for litigants in different parts of the
country.161 The Michigan Supreme Court has been characterized as, “to
say the least, . . . not very receptive to the certified question.”162 The
court has often declined to answer certified questions, refused to state
the reasons for not answering, and has been “even more hostile” to
questions presented by federal district courts.163 In a recent answer to a
certified question, Chief Justice Young began his concurring opinion by
clarifying that he wrote “only to explain why, given my longstanding
views on the questionable constitutionality of responding to certified
questions from federal courts, I choose to participate in responding to
the instant certified question.”164 Young’s opinion is that the court
should only answer certified questions “when the Michigan legal issue

158. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 122, at 420.
159. Id. at 420–21.
160. Id. at 397.
161. It is worth noting that while New York’s response quality and timeliness are
laudable, the state does not allow for questions to be posed from federal
district courts. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27(a) (2016).
162. M. Bryan Schneider, Note, “But Answer Came There None”: The Michigan
Supreme Court and the Certified Question of State Law, 41 Wayne L. Rev.
273, 315 (1994).
163. Id. at 315–17.
164. Deacon v. Pandora Media, Inc. (In re Certified Question from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit), 885 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Mich. 2016) (Young,
C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Young does bring up a valid concern about
the constitutionality of certified questions. Given that many states have
constitutions modeled after the U.S. Constitution, certified questions could
run afoul of the prohibition against advisory opinions. For a discussion of
the constitutionality of certified questions, using Michigan’s constitution as
an example, see Schneider, supra note 162, at 308–12.
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is a debatable one and pivotal to the federal case that prompted the request for the certified question.”165
Timeliness lies at the crux of easing the burden on litigants, and
state courts vary in their ability to satisfy that element through certified questions. Judge Bruce Selya of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit noted that after certifying a question to the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the court did not respond until years
later and stated that it would not be answering the question.166 While
this incident lies on the extreme side, it is not an uncommon occurrence.167
The mechanisms currently in place—England reservations and certified questions—both do well in an ideal world. An England reservation
can ensure that the right to return to a federal district court is protected, but protecting against the additional burdens of abstention is
beyond the scope of the mechanism. Certified questions have the potential to help ease the burden on litigants significantly, but its usefulness is largely controlled by the state courts, and it suffers from a lack
of uniformity to be a conclusive answer to the difficulties abstention
creates.

III. Solutions and Consequences to Changes in
Abstention
The purpose of these solutions is to create a system that works as
efficiently as possible while deferring as much as possible to the plaintiff’s choice of the federal forum. To the extent that any proposed
changes to the current system are ambiguous in their application to a
case, the preference should be to allow the litigant to remain in federal
court.
This Note aims to codify only certain aspects of the current
abstention doctrines. Generally, the proposal is to alter the requirements for when Pullman and Burford abstention can be invoked, to
abolish the practice of Thibodaux and Younger abstention entirely, and
to make Colorado River abstention more easily invoked.

165. Deacon, 855 N.W.2d at 634 (quoting M.M. v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r (In re
Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mich.), 825
N.W.2d 566, 573 (Mich. 2012) (Young, C.J., dissenting)).
166. Selya, supra note 149, at 681.
167. See id. at 681 n.18 (noting that delay is the biggest problem in the procedure
and collecting cases in which the state court delayed answering certified
questions by a range of thirteen months to six years).
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A. Expand the Use of Certified Questions

Certified questions are a source of untapped potential. While in
some jurisdictions the process works quite well, it suffers from a lack of
uniformity across the country.168 Since this is still largely a state-controlled mechanism, there is only so much that can be done, but adding
federal guidelines built around the notion of certified questions can
allow for federal courts to maneuver with greater ease regardless of a
given state’s disposition on the subject.169
To account for differences in various state statutes and rules governing certified questions, a federal statute covering certified questions
can give a federal court options when a state does not provide specific
protections. The first step would be to introduce a provision that leads
the federal courts away from abstention in favor of certified questions
where available. This provision would bar the courts from abstaining
from a case when a certified question would otherwise resolve the issue.
The next consideration would be the timing of the answer to the
question. New York prided itself on being able to answer questions in
an average time of six months.170 Pennsylvania requires all questions be
resolved within sixty days.171 California does not specify a time for answering certified questions, but the California Constitution suspends
the salary of any judge before whom a question remains pending for
ninety days after being submitted for decision, although this does not
account for the amount of time it takes from certification to submission.172 To ensure uniformity over timing, the proposed legislation will
include a provision requiring the federal court to withdraw the question
if an answer has not been produced within six months. This would give
the state court adequate time to respond, but also protect litigants from
having to postpone their cases for longer than necessary to reasonably
allow the state to be heard on the issue.
Should the state court decline to answer the question, the federal
court would continue to move forward with the case. If the state court
decides it does not want to answer the question, the federal court can
treat that non-response as implied approval for a federal decision on
168. See id. at 681.
169. As a theoretical exercise, Judge Selya opined on Congressional action
requiring state courts to accept and answer certified questions. Aside from
constitutional concerns, Judge Selya noted that such a one-way provision
would never work, as “cooperative judicial federalism cannot be force-fed to
the states without destroying both the spirit and the utility of the practice.”
Id. at 684.
170. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 122, at 397.
171. Pa. Sup. Ct. Internal Operating P. § 8(B).
172. Cal. R. Ct. 8.548; Cal. Const. art. VI, § 19.
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the state law issue. In many cases regarding Pullman and Burford abstention, this process could essentially obviate their use.
This provision could, first and foremost, pose a great risk of the
“friction” that the Pullman Court warned about.173 While this could potentially be a step forward for efficient litigation in federal courts, it
would undoubtedly impose burdens on the highest courts in each state.
Increasing the number of questions posed to the state courts could lead
to the state courts simply declining to answer the questions, especially
if this process begins to erode cooperative federalism in the courts.
A more optimistic look on the provision is that the state courts can
utilize truncated proceedings to exercise more control over how the federal courts interpret unsettled areas of law. Should state courts look to
the provision as an opportunity, the consequences would rise above
adding more work without increased results. Should the state court look
to the provision as an insult,174 at least the uniform timing would prevent the litigant from being too negatively impacted by a long delay.175
A compromise, if necessary, could be to allow the state courts, in their
response, to decline to answer while simultaneously requesting abstention from the federal courts.176
Ultimately, a federal provision on certified questions would ideally
solve the problem of the lack of uniformity and ease the burden of prolonged litigation, while it would also allow the state courts a mechanism
by which they can influence the interpretation of their own laws. It
would take good faith from all involved in order to work, but it gives
all parties something to gain. Certified questions as currently used are,
173. While this Note takes the position that communication and collaboration—
principles with which this proposed legislation was designed—promote
harmony between the state and federal courts, this may not be a widely
accepted position. See Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 114, 162 (2009) (“[S]tate courts have the power and duty to address
federal questions . . . . When a state court answers a certified question,
however, it has been deprived of this power.”).
174. See id. at 166 (“Federal judges confronted with an open and challenging
question of state law should see the case as a reason for harder work and
deeper thought, not quitting the field. The alternative is not comity, but
disrespect for states . . . .”). This Note agrees with Professor Long that
federal judges should be inclined to tackle unanswered questions, even if they
pertain to state issues, but further argues that certified questions are much
better suited than abstention in the rare circumstances outlined above.
175. Judge Selya’s two-to-three-year wait time to hear that the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico will be declining to answer the certified question is completely
unacceptable. See Selya, supra note 149, at 681.
176. Whether the federal court grants the request is the first in a potentially long
series of questions about this approach, but this Note takes the stance that
cooperative federalism can be made stronger through communication.
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at least on a national level, underutilized, and an improvement can do
well to reconcile the various policy goals at play.
B. Additional Requirements for Pullman and Burford Abstention

Notwithstanding the previous Section, the Pullman Court’s
“friction” rationale is, at best, too abstract. While there can be some
benefit to state supreme courts being the first to interpret the laws of
their jurisdictions, the fact that a predictive federal court ruling could
one day be displaced by a state supreme court ruling is a concern outweighed by the cost to litigants. And while the Court has anchored
Burford abstention to a more predictable set of circumstances, it should
be interpreted more narrowly to reduce the transaction costs that further litigation would entail.
Even if the use of certified questions is expanded, changing state
laws individually is not an effective option.177 Thus, the proposals in
Part III.A must deal with the reality that not all state courts accept
certified questions from federal district courts. Thus, the proposed legislation requires contingencies for instances in which certified questions
are not possible.
Rather than putting the focus of Pullman and Burford on how
unclear a state law may be or how complex a state regulatory system
may be, the focus should fall onto the possible outcome. The federal
district judge should abstain from ruling on the case only if the state’s
interest in hearing the case first is both overwhelmingly strong and a
decision on the state-law issue will have a unique impact on the state.178
While somewhat subjective in nature, this is meant as an extremely
high bar to act as a general deterrent against the use of abstention in
these circumstances. This should be discretionary for the judge, and an
appellate court can review the decision for abuse of discretion. While
determining whether to abstain or hear the case, a federal district judge
should always analyze the situation with a weight already placed on
the side of not abstaining.179
The general aim of this proposal is to promote leaving the case
within federal jurisdiction. Possible consequences could be abuse of discretion by district judges, as they could abstain for subjective reasons.
177. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
178. While this language is purposely vague, the circumstances in Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), come to mind as a proper use of abstention
for this reason. Because of the unique and powerful impact commercial
salmon fishing has on Alaska and its residents, abstaining to allow Alaska a
chance to shape the issue moving forward was the correct decision. Id. at
86–87.
179. In the event that a state’s highest court requests abstention in a certified
question response, the weight should instead be placed on the side of
abstaining.
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An appeal on a decision to abstain or to not abstain would increase litigation costs, but at least with this method the costs are being expended
in the litigant’s original choice of forum.
Another danger to raising the bar for Pullman and Burford
abstention is forum shopping. If federal courts in a given state are coming to different conclusions on important questions of state law, litigants may try to use this to their advantage when bringing suit.180 This
could be counteracted on appeal, which would generally open the door
to posing a certified question to the state court. So even if forum shopping begins to take place, the state would have the motive and opportunity to address the issue through the certified question procedure.
C. Abolish Thibodaux and Younger Completely

To the extent that the proposed solutions do not cover everything,
it is preferable that the lower courts not abstain when they should
rather than abstain when they should not. Therefore, to the extent that
abolishing Thibodaux and Younger brings more litigants to federal
courts than there otherwise should be, that is considered a feature, not
a bug.
While this Note is focused more on the practical effects of abstention than on its source of power, it is worth noting that in his separation
of powers argument, Martin Redish wrote that Thibodaux abstention is
“[b]y far [one of] the least justifiable forms of abstention.”181 Because
Thibodaux directly contradicts a congressional statute giving jurisdiction in diversity cases, and because diversity jurisdiction was designed
to avoid out-of-state bias, it should no longer be used.182
Younger is peculiar because of its relationship with the AntiInjunction Act, both being mechanisms for prohibiting the injunction
of a state court proceeding in certain circumstances.183 Since the AntiInjunction Act covers many of the same dangers against which Younger
tries to protect, the Anti-Injunction Act can pick up a significant
180. The extent to which modifying abstention may influence the viability of
forum shopping may necessarily be undesired, at least within the larger
context of current norms. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a
Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 267,
291 (1996) (“There are no uniform opinions on the acceptability of filing
lawsuits in given venues in order to obtain more favorable laws or more
favorable juries. But the overwhelming majority of decisions accepts these
two types of forum-shopping as legitimate tactical maneuvers.”).
181. Redish, supra note 114, at 98.
182. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“Diversity jurisdiction is
founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from
susceptibility to potential local bias.”).
183. See supra Part I.D (discussing Younger and its relationship with the AntiInjunction Act).
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amount of slack should Younger abstention no longer exist. And again,
to the extent that this leads more litigants to remain in federal court,
that is not considered troublesome.
D. Expand Colorado River Abstention

Courts should feel more empowered to abstain based on Colorado
River abstention. While this may appear odd, given the largely antiabstention sentiment conveyed thus far, Colorado River provides the
courts, both state and federal, with an opportunity to avoid the redundant practice of working through the same issues more than once, or to
avoid working through multiple issues in separate forums all at once.184
A strict first-in-time rule may be on the extreme side, but it should
be one of the most important factors in considering whether the court
should abstain. The Supreme Court has since expanded on its initial
factors for Colorado River abstention, and that provides a good starting
point for codification. Essentially, if there are two cases on the same
issue occurring simultaneously, a federal court should give serious consideration to abstention. So long as the litigants can be afforded an
adequate forum—which should not be a problem within the United
States185—a reduction of judicial waste should take precedence. While
the current system urges Colorado River abstention in only the clearest
cases, this ought to be changed in order to allow federal courts more
freedom to take measures to ease the burden on litigants.

IV. Proposed Abstention Law
1. A federal court may abstain from hearing a case arising under
federal law when:
(A) The case contains an issue of state law on which no
definitive guidance can be found from the state’s highest court,
and:
(1) The state does not allow the federal court to pose
a certified question of law;
(2) A reasonable construction of the issue of state law
would render deciding a constitutional issue
unnecessary;

184. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983)
(“There is no force here to the consideration that was paramount in Colorado
River itself—the danger of piecemeal litigation.”).
185. Forum adequacy is typically an analysis by U.S. courts of foreign judiciaries,
not domestic. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1444, 1460 (2011).
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(3) The state’s interest in deciding the issue in its own
judicial system is strong; and
(4) The issue has a unique impact on the state.
(B) The case exists alongside a parallel state court proceeding,
and after balancing the following factors, with an extra weight
added to abstention, abstaining would promote judicial
economy in an adequate forum:
(1) Which forum first claimed jurisdiction;
(2) Relative progress made in each proceeding;
(3) Inconvenience of the forum;
(4) Desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation;
(5) Source of the law in question.
2. A federal court may certify a question of law to a state’s highest
court when:
(A) The state has a certified question procedure; and
(B) The case contains an issue of state law on which no
definitive guidance can be found from the state’s highest court;
but
(C) The federal court must withdraw the question and resume
proceedings if the state does not respond within six months.

Conclusion
While abstention involves several competing interests, paramount
among them should be a reduction in judicial waste with the cost to
the litigants kept in mind. The courts have thus far used abstention in
a manner that solves only a few problems, if any, while significantly increasing the cost to the individuals involved in the case. In some circumstances, this may only be a monetary burden, but in other cases, like
that of Grand Juror Doe, current abstention policy can have the effect
of chilling free speech and nullifying an individual’s desire to exercise
his or her constitutional rights.
Ultimately, creating a better use of abstention is difficult given the
elements of federalism at play between the federal and state court systems. While this proposed legislation can only make an impact on the
federal side of this issue, it is drafted with the goal of ensuring efficient
litigation in an adequate forum, doing its best to ensure the plaintiff’s
choice of venue. Reforming abstention doctrines into a federal law not
only promotes a more streamlined judicial system, but it also gives more
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clarity to judges confronted with these situations. Both outcomes hopefully work to create a more efficient judicial system for those who choose
to utilize it.
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